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RESPONSIBILITY FOR ABUSIVE GRANTING
OF SOVEREIGN LOANS'
Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky*

I.

ABSTRACT

P77HIS article develops two main points in the theory of responsibility
for abusive granting of credit: first, the various case laws and doctrines developed in national legal systems (France, Belgium, Italy,
Germany, the United States, England, Spain and Argentina) are summarized into a "general theory of the responsibility for abusive granting of
credit"; second, it is argued that this general theory can be extended from
private law to a general principle of internationallaw, and thus can be
applied to sovereign insolvency, and a specific example of such an application of the theory is sketched out. Furthermore,by way of an introduction,
we explain the economic causes of sovereign over-indebteness, focusing on
the behaviour of creditors.
We conclude that under restricted conditions, with a limited scope, and
without disregardingthe varied nature of the players (the state and its creditors of various kinds), there would be legal and economic justificationfor
extending the application of the rules established in the original abusive
credit context to sovereign debt. In particular,loans granted without following the most elementary prudentialguidelines with regard to the analysis of credit risk should be subordinatedto those not classified as abusive in
the case of bankruptcy.
II.

DESCRIPTION OF THE PROBLEM

Over the last few decades, commercial law in Europe and certain countries in the Americas have been confronted with a highly complex issue,
both factually and legally: the responsibility of banks for the abusive
granting of loans. Legal doctrine, and to a lesser extent case law, has put
a lot of thought and effort into developing a balanced approach towards
this problem, which remains a salient topic for debate among legal
Fellow at Hauser Global Law School Program, New York University; European
Ph.D., Salamanca University; LL.M., Austral University.
1. This paper is a summary of the European Ph. D. thesis at the Faculty of Law,
University of Salamanca, 2007. I would like to thank my tutors, Professors Fernando Carbajo Casc6n (University of Salamanca) and Kunibert Raffer (University
of Vienna).
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experts.

2

2. There is a vast amount of legal literature on "responsibility for abusive granting of
credit." See A. ADELINE, Responsabilite civile du banquier dispensateur de credit:
Le Droit Anglais, Banque, N* 573 (Sept. 1996); A. ALTERINI, La responsabilidad
civil del banquero dador de credito: precisiones conceptuales, E.D., 132-966; F.
ANELLI, La responsabilitt risarcitoria delle banche per illeciti commessi
nell'erogazione del credito, Diritto della Banca e del Mercato Finanziario (1998);
C. ANGELICI, ET AL., I CONTRATTI DELLE BANCHE (UTET Universita 1988)
(2002).; G. AULETrTA & N. SALANITRO, DIRITro COMMERCIALE, (Giuffr6 1993)
(2006); D. BADENS, & G. ASTARLOA, La responsabilidad de las entidades
financieras por el otorgamiento abusivo del credito, E.D. 132-305; E. BAILEY & H.
GROVES, CORPORATE INSOLVENCY. LAW AND PRACTICE, (LexisNexis Butterworths 2007) (1992); DOUGLAS BAIRD & T. JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND

MATERIAL ON BANKRUPTCY (Little, Brown & Co.2007) (1985); A.
K.

HOPT,

HANDELSGESETZBUCH,

BECK'SCHER

&
Beck,

BAUMBACH,

KURz-KOMMENTAR,

Minchen, 2005 (mimeo); S. Bergel & M. Paolantonio, Responsabilidad civil de las
entidades financieras en las operaciones de crddito al consumo, REVISTA DE DER0

ECHO PRIVADO Y COMUNITARIO, N 18, 1998; P. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS. PROBLEMS IN THE BANKRUPTCY OR REORGANIZATION OF PARENT
AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS, INCLUDING THE LAW OF CORPORATE GUARANTIES

(Little

Brown & Co

1985); R. Bohner, La lutte contre la criminilatv

economique en Allemagne, in RESPONSABILITE PROFESSIONELLE DU BANQUIER:
CONTRIBUTION

A LA PROTECTION

DES CLIENTES DE BANQUE (Recherches

Pan-

theon-Sorbonne Universitd de Paris I, Sdrie Sciences Juridiques Droit des Affaires
ed. 1978); C. BOLLINI SHAW, Responsabilidad de los bancos por la concesidn de
creditos a entidades insolventes, E.D., 115-552; A. Borgioli, Responsabilitu della
banca per concessione abusiva di credito?, GIURISPRDENZA COMMERCIALE, SOCIETA E FALLIMENTO I (1981); N. Bourdall6 & J. Lasserre Capdeville, Le developpement jurisprudentiel de l'obligation de mise en garde du banquier, CAHIER DE
RECHERCHE N'5, ESC PAU (Dec. 2005); A. Brunet, La responsabilite civile du
banquier dispensateur de credit, Diritto della Banca e del Mercato Finanziario
(1998); A. Bruynel, Le Memoire de Barsy sur la responsabilit6 du donneur de
credit, Revue de la Banque 1 (1977)1; A. BUTHURIEUX, RESPONSABILITI DU BANQUIER. ENTERPRISES EN DIFFICULT8. CREDIT FAUTIF. EXPERTISE (Litec 1999); J.P.
Buyle & D. Goffaux, Les devoirs du banquier d l'6gard de l'entreprise, in LA BANQUE DANS LA VIE DE L'ENTREPRISE (8ditions du Jeune Barreau de Bruxelles
2005); C. CANARIS, Kreditkindigung und Kreditverweigerung gegeniiber sanierung-

sbediirftigen Bankkunden, ZHR N' 143 (1979); 0. Capolino, Rapporti tra banca e
impresa: revoca degli affidamenti e ricorso abusivo al credito, IL FALLIMENTO N0 9
(1997); A. Castiello d'Antonio, La banca tra 'concessione abusiva' e 'interruzione
brutale' del credito, RIFORMA URGENTE DEL DIRrrro FALLIMENTARE E LE
BANCHE N' 5 (2005); J. Cattaruzza, Le banque et lentreprise en dificulte, REVUE
DE LA FACULTE DE DROIT DE LIGE (1997); E. CHIAVASSA, E. & E. RICHARD,
Responsabilidad por abuso crediticio, (ACADEMIA NACIONAL DE DERECHO Y
CIENCIAS SOCIALES DE CORDOBA 2007), available at, http://www.acaderc.org.ar/

doctrina/articulos/artresponsabilidadabusocrediticio; R. Clark, The Duties of the
Corporate Debtor to Its Creditors, 90 HARV. L. REV. 505, (1977); D. COWANS,
COWANs BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE, Vol. III, 6th edition, (6th ed., West

Publishing Co. 1994); R. Cuignet, La responsabilite juridique du banquier donner
de credit, REVUE DE LA BANQUE N' 1 (1976); B. Demonty, Derniers ddveloppements en matiere de responsabilite du banquier dispensateur de credit, in 24 DROITS
BANCAIRE, CAMBIAIRE ET FINANCER 69 (Formation Permanent (CUP) 1998),
available at http://www.droit.ulg.ac.be/CUp/index.php?menu=vol&id=23; F. Des-

semontet, La responsabilit6 de la banque dispensatrice de credits comme organe de
fait de son d~biteur, in MtLANGES KARL H. NEUMAYER 403-423 (1997); F. DI
MARZIO, ABUSO NELLA CONCESSIONE DEL CREDITO (Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane
2004); D.EPSTEIN, ET AT., BANKRUPTCY (West Publishing Co. 1993); J. FALCON
FERR8, Los CRtDITOS SUBORDINADOS (Civitas 2006); FERNANDEZ-ARMESTO, J. &

DE CARLOS BERTRAN, L., El Derecho del Mercado Financiero, Civitas, Madrid,
1992; F. FERNANDEZ DE LA GANDARA & M. SANCHEZ ALVAREZ, COMENTARIOS
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The conceptual framework on which the theory of abusive credit has
been built arose in the context of private legal relations (banks as lenders
and companies as borrowers). Its basic features are as follows: a lending

entity that supports a company financially disregards the most elementary
rules of credit risk assessment, encouraging investments and loans that
are excessive and inefficient. This might cause real harm to third party
A LA LEY CONCURSAL (Marcial Pons 2004); M. Ferrari, Legittimazione del curatore
per abusiva concessione del credito:plurioffensivitd dell'illecito a! patrimonio e alla

garanziapatrimoniale,23

CORRIERE GIURIDICO

419 (2006); D. FERREIRA

RUBIO,

Responsabilidadcivil de las entidades financieraspor el otorgamiento abusivo del
crdito, L.L. (1992); D. FISCHEL, The Economics of Lender Liability, 99 YALE L. J.
131 (1989); G. Franchina,, La responsabilitddella bancapoT concessione abusiva de
credito, 63 IL DIRiTrO FALLIMENTARE I (1988); F. Galgano, Civile e penale nella
responsabilitddel banchiere, CONTRATTO E IMPRESA 1 (1987); C. Gavalda, Banque.

Opdrations de credit, JURIS-CLASSEUR

COMMERCIAL ANNEXES (Techniques 1977);
C, GAVALDA & J. STOUFFLET, DROIT BANCAIRE. INSTITUITIONS. COMPTES. OPERATIONS. SERVICES (Litec 1992); F. GIORGIANNI & C. M. TARDIVO, MANUALE DI
DiRuriro BANCARIO (Giuffr 2005); M. HERBERT, UNDERSTANDING BANKRUPTCY

(Matthew Bender Irwin 1995); K. Hopt, Rechtsplichten der Kreditinstitute zur
Kreditversorgung, Kreditbelassung und Sanierung von Unternehmen, ZHR 143,
(1979); B. Inzitari, Irregolaritd del fido e responsabilitd della banca per concessione

abusiva del credito, in

SCRI-rI IN ONORE DI LUIGI MENGONI

T' II (Giuffr6 ed.,

1995); A. Lhospice & M. Meissonnier, La responsabilit du banquier fonde sur

l'octroi de crdit excessif, CAHIER

DE RECHERCHE

N'3 (ESC PAU 2004); H. J.

Mertens, Zur Bankenhaftung wegen Glaubigerbenachteiligung, ZHR N' 143
(1979); L. NANNI, Abuso della banca nella concessione di credito ad impresa insolvente, IL FALLIMENTO II (1996); Giovanni Nardecchia, L'abusiva concessione
del credito all'esame delle sezioni unite, 8111 Diritto Fallimentare e delle SocietA
Commerciali 630 (2006); A. Nigro, La responsabilitd della banca per concessione
abusiva del credito, GIUR. COMM. I (1978); id., Note minime in tema di responsabilitd per concessione 'abusiva' di credito e di legittimazione del curatore fallimentare, DIR. BANC. I (2002); C. RIBERA, Una sentencia ejemplar del juez Mosso

respecto a la concesi6n abusiva del cridito y los concursos, DERECHO

Y EMPRESA

(Universidad

Austral 2004); F. Rizzo, LE TRAITEMENT JURIDIQUE DE
LENDETrEMENT (Presses Universitaires d'Aix-Marseille 1996); L. Russo Legitimazione del curatore all'azioneper 'abusiva' concessione di credito, 5 IL DIRITrO
FALLIMENTARE (2006), nota a Corte Suprema di Cassazione, Sezioni Unite, March
28 de 2006, N' 7030; M.A. SANCHEZ MIGUEL, La responsabilidadde las entidades

de crddito en su actuaci6n profesional,38

REVISTA DE DERECHO BANCARIO Y BUR-

SATIL 319 (1990); H. SchOnle, La responsabilitjextra-contractuelledu donneur de

credit envers les tiers en droit suissse,

SOCI-T¢ ANONYME SUISSE

49 (1977); id.,

Rechtsvergleichende Aspekte (Frankreich, Belgien, Schweiz) der Bankenhafung
aus Sanierungsaktionen, ZHR 143 (1979); R. Sgroi Santagati, "Concessione
abusiva del credito' e 'brutaleinterruzione del credito': due ipotesi di responsabilitd
della banca, IL DIRrro FALLIMENTARE 1 (1994); L. SIMONT & A. BRUYNEEL., LA
RESPONSABILITt EXTRA-CONTRACTUELLE

DU

DONNEUR

DE

CRtDIT EN

DROIT

(Feduci 1984 ); E. STUMVOLL, Avoidance of Transfer: Section 548,
BANKR. DEV. J. (1986); R. TETI & P. MARANO, I CONTRATrI BANCARI (Giuffr6
Editore 1999); I.J. TRUJILLO DIEZ, EL SOBREENDEUDAMIENTO DE LOS CONSUMIDORES (Universidad de Castilla - La Mancha); P. VAN OMMESLAGHE, La
COMPAR

responsabilit6du banquierdispensateurde credit en droit beige, SOCICTP ANONYME
SUISSE 49 (1977); M. VASSEUR, LA RESPONSABILITP CIVILE DU BANQUIER DISPENSATEUR DE CRPDIT, (Banque Ed. 1978); J. VEZIAN, LA RESPONSABILITt DU BANQUIER EN DROIT PRIVI FRAN(;AIS (Litec 1983); A. Zenner & L. M. Henrion, La
responsabilit6du banquierdispensateurde credit en droit belge, 5303 JOURNAL DES
TRIBUNAUX

(1984); Zenner, Responsabilites du donneur de credit, REVUE

(1974); F. ZUNZUNEGUI,
Marcial Pons 1997).
BANQUE

DERECHO DEL MERCADO FINANCIERO

DE LA

(2' ed.,
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creditors who are in a commercial relationship with the recipient of the
loans, and also to the general interest in banking activity.
Doctrine and case law that have considered this theory have centered
mainly on the position of third party creditors. It has been stated that
harm caused by abusive loans can affect both creditors existing prior to
3
the granting of the credit and those subsequently becoming creditors.
The former could be harmed by the fact that abusive credit could postpone the filing of bankruptcy. During this delay the financial situation of
the debtor company might worsen, resulting in creditors receiving less
than if bankruptcy had been declared sooner. Subsequent creditors, on
the other hand, could suffer harm from having been seduced into granting credit to an insolvent company based on the mistaken assumption
that the financing granted to the company by the financial institution
demonstrated its healthy financial situation.
A fundamental characteristic of these types of loans is that they involve
an abuse of commercial trust by banks that, either with deliberate intent
or through negligence, end up triggering an incorrect assessment of the
actual state of the company. The importance of confidence and appearance in the context of the financial market is,4therefore, a leading element
in the analysis of this type of responsibility.
The earliest case law referring to the abusive granting of credit that
concerned credit relations between banks and borrowing companies in
from France from 1876 to 1881. The theory of abusive credit has since
been extended. It is already enshrined in the protection provided to consumers in the case of credit granted abusively by banks and companies
supplying goods and services, commonly known as trivialization of consumer credit. 5 The concept here is the same as that originally conceived
in the strictly commercial sense: the granting of loans without due consideration of the borrower's repayment capacity. Furthermore, the abusive
credit theory has been extended beyond the strict credit concept to include material assistance such as exists in business relationships. This situation could be described as non-financial over-stocking.
In a similar manner, studies of the public sphere have shown that states
sometimes also award abusive loans to companies through public financial entities6 . The possibility has even been examined of holding the state
responsible for indirect assistance it might provide to companies, either
through undue delays in collecting fiscal or social security contributions,
or by providing support through assigning or reserving markets (mainly
in the field of public services).
3. See specially the French, Belgian and Italian academic and judicial production
quoted supra, note 2.
4. M.A. DE CASTRO PORTUGAL CARNEIRO DA FRADA, TEORIA DA CONFIANCA E
RESPONSAB LIDADE CIVIL (Almedina, ed., Coimbra 2004).
5. J. Pottow, Private Liabilityfor Reckless Consumer Lending, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV.

405 (2007).
6. G. Likillimba, Le soutien abusif d'une enterprise en difficultd (2nd ed., Litec
2001), p. 273.
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The notion of the lender has thus been broadened to include not only
banks, but also the state itself. Borrowers can be consumers, not just
enterprises, and the nature of the credit has grown to include material as
well as financial assistance. The common denominator is always the
granting of credit (or confidence) regardless of the merit of the borrower
as determined by credit risk analysis and how this could cause harm to
third parties.
Here we will focus on one particular form of abusive credit, the granting of abusive credit to states, commonly known as sovereign lending.
Although a pressing problem, it seems that it has received only limited
attention in the past. We will shortly demonstrate that the theory in question could find support (although with varying degrees of acceptance) in
the legal doctrine and in the case law of various European countries, the
United States and Argentina. 7 In the second section, we will explore the
theory, analyze its justification, and highlight the common denominators
found in the various domestic jurisdictions. In the third section, we will
carry out an analysis in search of general legal principles that could be
assigned universal validity and their application to sovereign insolvency.
However, first the causes of sovereign over-indebtedness and its development will be described, as they form the basis for the application of this
theory of abusive loans.
III.

SOVEREIGN OVER-INDEBTEDNESS AND
CAUSES OF THE DEBT CRISIS

The relationship between the cycles of the real economy and the evolution of external debt, and, in turn, the way in which debt cycles follow one
another, form the overall framework for the interpretation and analysis
of the behavior of sovereign debtors and their lenders.
The origins of the current debt crisis can be found in the heavy indebtedness incurred in the 1970s. The apparent reason was a strong systemic
inflow of financing from developed nations, which was to some extent
due to the massive recycling of petro-dollars that were partly from the
euro-dollar market, and to the establishing of a legal system that facilitated and encouraged loans to the countries in the southern hemisphere.
On the actor level, lending banks adopted a so-called "loan pushing" policy, granting loans to sovereign nations that did not possess a repayment
capacity in accordance with the volume of debt they were contracting.8
The dictatorial nature of many borrowing governments contributed to
an inefficient use of the loans. This was complemented and reinforced
by, among others, capital flight, the financing of unrealizable and unprof7. Using the method originally proposed by H.

LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAW
SOURCES AND ANALOGIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION) (The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd.) (2002).

8. W.

DARITY

& B.

HORN, THE LOAN PUSHERS. THE ROLE OF COMMERCIAL BANKS

(Ballinger Publishing Co. 1988); C. Lichtenstein, The U.S. response to the internationaldebt crisis: The International Lending
Supervision Act of 1983, 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 401 (1985).
IN THE INTERNATIONAL DEBT CRISIS
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itable projects, the maintenance of unviable monetary systems, corruption of public officials, waste of funds, and by the nationalization of
private debt. These imbalances accentuated the discrepancy between the
debt incurred and real repayment possibilities.
Notwithstanding the early warning issued by the World Bank's Pearson
Commission (1969), 9 banks and head office regulatory bodies failed to
perform elementary evaluations of the real risk implicit in these operations. Loans were granted in violation of basic principles of bank prudence, whether viewed individually or in relation to their overall effect on
10
bank balance sheets.
At the beginning of the 1980s, the abrupt and significant increase in
interest rates for loans, combined with a marked deterioration in the
terms of trade for the indebted nations, threw the inability of developing
countries to repay the loans into sharp relief. First arrears appeared and
lending was subsequently suspended. The risk of collapse faced by leading U.S. banks due to the failure of their debtors to repay sovereign debt
led international financial agencies (IFIs) to intervene and sponsor rescue
packages for those banks. At the same time, the banks were pressured
into continuing to finance these debtors so as to prevent them from defaulting, all of which led to an even higher stock of debt.
Together with the granting of this so-called "fresh money," structural
adjustment programs were implemented based on the false premise that
the problem was one of short-term liquidity rather than of long-term solvency. Recognition of the need to reduce the debt came with the Brady
Plan, which made it possible to transfer this portfolio of "hot loans" to
other private investors once bank reserve levels had recovered". The
Brady Plan provided structural adjustment programs with continuity,
reinforcing Washington Consensus policies, and, in particular, foreign direct investment in response to deregulation 12.
After initial optimism, which was soon revealed to be unfounded, the
1990s saw increased financial indebtedness of sovereign debtors who received a significant amount of speculative short-term investment, mainly
through sovereign bonds.' 3 As a result, over-indebtedness was further
increased, aggravating in that way the financial vulnerability of these
countries, provoked by the short-term and the foreign currency structure
9. P. Robson, Partners in Development: Report of the Commission on International
Development, 69 OXFORD J. OF AFR. AnF. 394 (1969).
10. LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 8.
11. See M. MONTEAGUDO, "The debt problem: The Baker Plan (1985) and the Brady
initiative (1989) - History, experience, practice and prospects,"in CARREAU &
SHAW, La dette extdrieure - The external debt, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995,
p. 157 ff.
12. H.J. CHANG & I. GRABEL, Reclaiming Development: An Alternative Economic

Policy Manual, Zed Books, London, 2004.
13. K. Raffer, Estrategiasinternacionalespara poner fin a los problemas de la deuda
externa, GLOBALIZACI6N, POBREZA Y DESARROLLO. LOS RETOS DE LA COOPERACION INTERNACIONAL (2005), available at http:/Ihomepage.univie.ac.at/kunibert.
raffer/MADRID.pdf.
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of their debts 14. This led to new defaults, to which conditions arguably
contributed, and to restrictive adjustment policies. When confronted by
defaults, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) reacted by granting financial rescue packages with consequences of dubious benefit.
In repetition of a stylized fact of the 1930s crisis, this period was characterized by the fact that a substantial part of government bonds were
issued and acquired without due diligence for the real possibilities of payment by the sovereign debtor. Certain banks and bond-placing agents
again appeared to have adopted an opportunistic, and at the same time
determining, attitude in executing such actions, channeling the investment of hundreds of thousands of savers to borrowers whose repayment
capacity was not always adequate. The IFIs may have contributed to this
bubble with an official criterion for external debt measurement that
places more importance on payments to be made by the debtor than on
5
arrears on the total debt owed.'
Efforts were made to reduce the debt of the poorer countries (the
Highly Indebted Poor Countries initiative)16[cite], but the limited and discretional use of this plan meant that it was practically ineffective in the
face of the problem of sovereign over-indebtedness. This fact, together
with the cyclical deterioration in terms of trade and the dependence on
external financing which this generated, might have led to a change in the
way the debt problem was confronted, inspired by the principles of bankruptcy law. Following these principles, in the case of insolvency, debt is
reduced to sustainable levels that are achieved by spreading the financial
burden between debtors and creditors. Among the latter, the loss is distributed on the basis of the elementary criteria of justice and equity, principles to which the theory of abusive credit can make a contribution.
IV.

GENERAL THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE
GRANTING OF ABUSIVE CREDIT

In this chapter I will attempt to systematize and synthesize a general
theory of responsibility for the granting of abusive credit, based on the
minimum common denominators of the private law systems of France,
Belgium, Italy, Germany, England, the United States, Spain, and Argentina. 17 Clearly, the country sample is not sufficiently large and a more
extensive comparative study would be required for results to be generalized. However, it is a representative sample in that it takes into account
14. IBD, Living with Debt. How to Limit the Risks of Sovereign Finance, Economic
and Social Progress in Latin America, 2007 Report, IBD, Washington, 2006
15. K. Raffer, Is the debt crisis largely over?. A criticallook at the data of International

Financial Institutions, in

CHALLENGING THE ORTHODOXIES

(Richard M. Auty &

John Toye, eds., Macmillan, London & Basingstoke 1996).
16. See details of this initiative in www.imf.org.
17. For a detailed analysis of each of these legal systems and their copious jurisprudence, see J.P. BOHOSLAVSKY, CRtDITOS ABUSIVOS. SOBREENDEUDAMIENTO DE
ESTADOS,

2009).

EMPRESAS Y CONSUMIDORES

(Ed. Abaco Buenos Aires) (forthcoming
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most of the legal systems of the main creditor countries to which developing countries are indebted, and the countries whose influential position
shapes the international environment in which, as it will be proposed below, to apply these principles.
Specialized doctrine and case law have developed the need for covering the abusive credit topic under the same title, but it should not be
considered exclusively as a civil liability issue (although the substantive
aspects of abusive credit have mostly been developed in this context).
Indeed, bankruptcy rules have made their contribution, in particular with
regards to the subordination of credits. For this reason, in this paper "responsibility for abusive credit" implies the duty to rebuild net worth after
harm has occurred through abusive credit lending as described by the
general theory. Depending on the legal system involved, this could be
channelled through civil liability or solutions that are typical of bankruptcy tools, with subordination being the most important of these.
Lenders are not unaffected by the consequences that their loans may
have on borrowers and third parties. The externalities generated by such
behavior in the market are not minor, and have led to the inclusion of a
special deontology for the exercise of the banking profession. In other
words, it can be said that there is a general principle based on the protection of legitimate expectations. While admitting a very wide discretional
margin appropriate to the risk implicit in the activity, banking rules impose minimum standards of professional diligence in relation to the eval18
uation of credit risk on loans.
Grantors of credit who act with the intention of harming other creditors must answer with their own wealth for such acts. This relates to
loans that deliberately support borrowers who are in insoluble economic
difficulties (inappropriate loans), as well as to loans made to those that
perform illegal activities (unworthy loans). In the case of inappropriate
loans, the irreversible state of economic collapse forms part of the structure of the illicit act, as an unreasonable risk is assumed in providing financial support that can only delay the fatal bankruptcy solution, further
eroding the net worth of the debtor's assets.
The second category of loans is defined by the unworthy nature of the
customer and the activity he performs, which are covered by the appearance of reliability implicit in the loan as well as by the illicit means used
to obtain it 19 . [cite] The first category includes companies with illegal
intentions (tax or customs fraud, import of forbidden products, etc.),
those that have a legitimate purpose but which carry it out in an illicit
manner (typical "dummy corporations" without economic substance, performing economic activities that are not translated into real operations
but into fraudulent maneuvers), and those that tend to be linked to or18. J. Stoufflet, "Devoirs et responsabilites du banquier a I'occasion de la distribution
du credit", in Gavalda, Responsabilitd professionnelle du banquier: contribution A
la protection des clientes de Banque, Economica, Paris, 1978, p. 23 ff..
19. Id., p. 34.
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ganized crime. The second category contemplated by unworthy credit is
related to the irregular means used to obtain financing.
The margin for contractual freedom operates within the limits imposed
by law, fundamentally through the guidelines that have been established
by case law. Each legal system imposes differing limits; a (perhaps
overly) simplified outline could be that France and Belgium are the strictest, followed by Italy and Argentina, and then Spain, the United States,
and lastly, Germany and England.
Negligence, the most frequent case in the evaluation of credit risk, is
even penalized in some countries. For example in Belgium (section 1382,
C.Civ.), Italy (section 2043, C.Civ.), to some extent in Spain (section
1902, C.Civ.) and Argentina (sections 1109 and 1113, C.Civ.), and to a
lesser extent in the United States (Bankruptcy Code section 548). In
Germany and England, this penalization only applies under certain limited circumstances.
France is a somewhat particular case. It was in this country where the
theory of the responsibility for abusive credit was born and grew vigorously. Its tort law (sections 1382 and 1383, C.Civ.) allows the offended to
claim when she was negligently harmed. But a recent July 25, 2005 Act
modified section 650 of the French Commerce Code to limit this specific
kind of responsibility to cases of fraud. This legislative technique, however, has been defective and there is confusion about the real extension
20
of this legal reform.
In the United States negligence claims are restricted. With the exception of a situation implying control relationships by banks that require
special duties of care, the trustee can only attempt to obtain a declaration
of nullity if he is able to demonstrate that the creditor attempted to hinder, delay, or defraud the interests of the remaining creditors (Bankruptcy Code s 548). Subordination of the loan can be claimed if an
inequitable behavior resulted in harm the remaining creditors, or if one
of them was granted an unfair advantage in detriment to the interests of
the rest (Bankruptcy Code s 510(c)).
These limitations on responsibility in cases of intent are rather academic, as the implicit fraud contemplated by section 548 establishes that
there is no need to demonstrate the intention to defraud the remaining
creditors. All that is required is a lack of proportion with regard to the
performance (harm) and concurrence of a situation in which the debtor is
collapsing, or, more specifically, an awareness of the lack of repayment
capacity of the borrower. All of this indicates the subjective element of
the lender.
20. R. Bonhomme, La responsabilidadpor concesi6n abusiva de crddito conforme a la

ley 2005-845, de 26 de julio de 2005,

REVISTA DE DERECHO CONCURSAL Y

N' 5 (2006); J-J Daigre, Criances bancaires et crdances
ordinairesdans la faillite du client : vers deux poids et deux mesures ?, REV. DR.
BANC. (2005); D. Legeais, Les concours consentis d une entreprise en difficult (C
corn. Art. 650-1), 1510 J.C.P. E (2005).
PARACONCURSAL
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In Germany it is necessary that a situation of undue privilege in relation to the remaining creditors (Bfirgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil
Code] section 826) exist. An example would be the Konkursverschleppung, whereby a bank puts off filing for bankruptcy against a customer to
the detriment of the remaining creditors so as to give the bank time to
foreclose on any collateral in its favor that it may have been able to obtain, or on such assets as may still remain in the possession of the debtor.
Nevertheless, it will be necessary to monitor the interpretation by the
courts that will be given the new text of articles 241 and 311 of the BGB
on the matter of contracts with protective effects for third parties.
In the case of England, unless there is a situation where the company is
controlled by the bank (shadow director), claims for compensation are
only admitted when there is an intention to defraud the remaining creditors and thus to take unfair advantage of them (fraudulent trading, Insolvency Act 1986, section 213).
The lack of an absolute consensus on the matter of responsibility for
the negligent granting of credit is only of relative importance in light of
the fact that all of the legal systems that were analyzed allow for the proof
of intent through evidence. This includes the proximity of the bankruptcy
date, the performance of irregular activities, the setting up of excessive
collateral, and the high rates of interest being required. All of these effectively provide guidance that removes the drama from the discussion of
the required subjective element. What is important is that it should be
possible to infer iuris tantum from certain determined events that the
grantor of the credit has intended to gain an unfair advantage with its
loans or to cause harm to the remaining creditors.
Regarding the measurement of damage, it has to be distinguished between creditors pre-existing to the harmful action and subsequent creditors. In the case of legal systems that recognize civil responsibility for
abusive credit, it is well established that in the case of pre-existing creditors the damage is measured in terms of the difference between what they
would have received if the debtor's situation had not worsened as a result
of the abusive credit and what they did actually receive in the distribution
from the liquidation process. In the case of subsequent creditors, the
damage will be determined as the difference between what they should
have received according to the contract and what they effectively received once the debt had been reduced as a result of the bankruptcy.
There is also a general agreement that the receiver in the bankruptcy
process is the legitimate party to demand compensation for the collective
harm caused by the erosion of net worth of the insolvent party from the
excessive credit granted by the lending entity (damage to pre-existing
creditors). On the other hand, the latter must claim damage to subsequent debtors seduced by the apocryphal solvency generated by the abusive credits independently and autonomously since the damage is
individual and specific in each case.
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As indicated above, the remedies used to correct the situation arising
from abusive credit vary according to the legal system, with the existence
of two basic mechanisms: claims for compensation by the means of bringing a legal action for extra-contractual responsibility (France, Belgium,
Italy, Germany, and Argentina) and the subordination of credits (England, United States, and Spain). The latter country is unusual in that it
contemplates the possibility of subordinating abusive credits (for example, LC articles seventy-three and ninety-two), but at the same time subsequent creditors are able to file claims in accordance with the rules on
tort liability (for example, article 1902 C.Civ.). The common denominator can be found in the intention to undo the effects of the credit qualified as abusive on the company's net worth, and thus on the rest of the
creditors.
The controversial case of responsibility regarding the borrower itself
(excluding fraud or collusion), and the consequent possibility of direct
claims, should not present any major difficulty. Such responsibility would
be inadmissible in the central hypothesis of loans granted in an imprudent
manner, as the borrower is in the best position to determine its own repayment capacity. Regardless, any claim that the borrower might have
brought in would be covered in its purposes and effects by the claims filed
by the trustee or the creditors themselves, or in subordination of credit
where appropriate, as they too aim for a recovery of the net worth of the
debtor.
As the central idea of such claims is based on the notion of compensation for harm, it is plausible to seek to distribute blame and causal links
among the various interested parties in the structure of this injurious hypothesis, and consequently, to assign portions of joint responsibility. This
includes putting the victims of the consequences of abusive credit into a
priority order.
The situation of individual borrowers has also given rise to the setting
of limits on the power of banks. A growing body of legislation has addressed consumer over-indebtedness that obliges the parties that made
such indebtedness possible to share some of the sacrifice arising from the
insolvency of the debtor in order to instigate lenders to make a more
careful evaluation of the reimbursement capacity of individuals. 2 1
Several common denominators have thus been found in the sophisticated legal technique applied to the problem of abusive granting of
credit; depending on the domestic legal system under examination, this
principle is admitted to varying degrees-substantive and procedural-by
the respective tort or bankruptcy laws, as well as by consumer statutes.
Structural differences in economic areas (higher influence of the banking
21. See, e.g., Code de la Consommation, July 27, 1993, J. Officiel de la Repupblique
Francaise [J.O] [Official Gazette of France], available at http://www.legifrance.
gouv.fr/affichCode.do?cidText= LEGITEXT000006069565&dateTexte=20083012;
Insolvenzordnung [Insolvency Statute], Oct. 5, 1994, Bundesgesetzblatt 1994 I S.
2866, §§ 286-314 (F.R.G.), available at http://www.bmj.bund.de/filesl-/685/Insolven
zordnungengl.pdf.
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system or of capital markets) of countries with respect to lending institutions appear to have an influence on the development and scope of the
theory of responsibility for abusive credit. However, this tends to become diluted in the case of the international financing of states, because,
in the field of international sovereign loans, the uniformity of financial
activity-and banking in particular-is greater than in the domestic environment. This encourages the drafting of universal rules in the field of
sovereign loans.
V.

APPLICATION OF THE THEORY OF ABUSIVE CREDIT IN
THE AREA OF SOVEREIGN LOANS

The similarities between sovereign and private insolvency 22 justify exploring the possibilities of applying the rules and remedies of collective
action problems 23 to the field of sovereign lending. These have been developed fundamentally in the sphere of bankruptcy law.
Of course, sovereign and private insolvency have obvious differences
resulting from the fact that states cannot be liquidated and dissolved in
the same way as legal persons (at least not as a result of their insolvency).
Although with declining effect, they enjoy immunity of jurisdiction and
execution. In addition, restructuring of sovereign debt cannot justify the
loss of governmental control by the entity, unlike the situation in the private sphere. The reduction of the debt, while in the case of private entities is a legal requirement, is subject to a decision that can be either
agreed upon mutually or taken unilaterally in the sovereign sphere.
None of this is an impediment to considering the two situations substantially comparable. Both types of borrowers are unable to repay their
loans. The origins of such situations also coincide (the situation has come
about as a result of the inadequate use of borrowed funds combined with
excessive, hazardous lending by creditors), and, in both cases, creditors
must accept a reduction in their claims while borrowers undertake to repay the lower debt agreed on, with suitable collateral, all of which is laid
down in an official document (a legally approved reorganization
program).
The notion that "states don't go bankrupt" is refuted by the factual
existence of hundreds of sovereign defaults, for which the definition of
over-indebtedness should be situated in an intermediate point between
the technical concept of insolvency (inability to service debts), the special
sovereign capacity to generate income, and the limits imposed by law
(dignity of debtor), whether domestic or international.
22. D. CARREAU, LA DETTE EXTItRIEURE. THE EXTERNAL DEBT 20 (Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers 1992).
23. N. Roubini, Do We Need a New Bankruptcy Regime, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON
ECON. ACTIvITY, Mar. 22, 2002, at 322-23. Sachs, Do we need an international
lender of last resort?, Frank Graham Lecture, (Princeton U. 1995), available at
www2.harvard.edu/cidpapers/intlir.pdf; S. L. SCHWARCZ, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Bankruptcy ReorganizationApproach, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 956 (2000).
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It has been this effort to achieve bankruptcy transposition that has inspired the work of specialists, official bodies and the courts, to define the
scope of legal rules such as pars contictio creditorum, to suspend legal
action once insolvency has been declared, to promote post-bankruptcy
credits by means of the recognition of preferential collection, to require
the majority of creditors to change the terms of the contracts that document the debts, and to reduce liabilities as a result of the insolvency of
the sovereign debtor.
The common denominators outlined in the above section are the basis
for attempting to transpose the theory of responsibility for the abusive
concession of credit from the domestic legal systems to the field of international law (article 38.1 (c) of the Statutes of the International Court of
Justice). Based on a restrictive criterion, the principles derived from the
general theory of abusive credit can be summarized in this more specific
field as the prohibition of unfair behavior by the granters of sovereign
credit.
Regarding the sovereign sphere, this theory seems to fall between the
two types of proposals that characterize the current state of legal thinking
in the field of sovereign insolvency: the so-called "collective action
problems" (in their basic categories, the insolvency models and the collective action clauses), and, on the other hand, the thesis that rejects the
validity of debts (on the grounds that they are odious).
Conceptually, the theory of abusive credit is nourished by elements
provided by both types of proposals, adding its own particular characteristics. This is how some loans are reprehensible (because of their abusive
nature, given the irrational risk implicit in them) but are neither fundamentally void nor reduced as a result of the debtor's inability to pay. Instead, they are subject to moral reproach, having been contracted in the
context of a situation of insolvency, which, as a consequence, justifies a
restoration of patrimony.
While there are two procedural options, in the sovereign sphere only
the subordination of credits would be applicable because the system of
civil responsibility that requires the trustee to bring in claims is not viable. 24 This is because in addition to the lack of such a figure (trustee), it
would lead to an endless stream of crossed claims, and for this reason it is
necessary to come up with a "self-sufficient system" adapted to the characteristics of sovereign insolvency. Furthermore, the immunity of IFIs (to
the limited extent to which it should be formally admitted 2 5) regarding
claims for compensation makes extra-contractual civil claims as a basic
procedural system even more inadvisable. This is because autonomous
24. It has been recently proposed the application of the debt subordination principle
to the sovereign debt field, but it is based only in the US law and related to the
odious condition of certain debts. See A. Feibelman, Contract,Priority,and Odious
Debt, 85 N.C. L. REV. 727 (2007); A. Feibelman, Equitable Subordination, Fraudulent Transfer and Sovereign Debt, L. & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS (forthcoming 2008).
25. M. Singer, JurisdictionalImmunity of International Organizations:Human Rights
and FunctionalNecessity Concerns, 36 VA. J. INT'L L. 53 (1995).
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claims are then admitted only in the case of subsequent creditors, a hypothesis that in practice is extremely limited as will be seen further on.
In the sovereign case, subordination simultaneously provides a comprehensive solution for all the credits involved in the insolvency and avoids
leaving them subject to the vicissitudes common to claims that involve
states. As far as substantive aspects are concerned, there are two reasons
for a sovereign debt to be rated as abusive. First of all, inadequate risk
analysis could be grounded in economic circumstances and lead to lending to a state that from the beginning can be seen to not be in a position
to repay the loan (inappropriate lending). This could be the case when
the loan is disproportionate in relation to the state's repayment potential
and when it was granted in the context of the debtor's insolvency. Such a
situation could arise, for example, when loans are renewed or debt is
rolled over even when it is evident that default is inevitable. These agreements could enable the creditor to obtain better contract terms, including
an increase in interest rates, improved payment guarantees, or increased
credit.
Secondly, there are so-called "unworthy loans" that generate an appearance of morality that, in the case of the state, implies the concealment of the state's real economic situation from third parties. Irrational
risk has a moral quality and can have economic consequences if the government's seriously reproachable activity or condition is disguised and if
this eventually affects the possibility of collection (for example, in the
case of corrupt governments, or if entering into illicit agreements). Furthermore, it can facilitate the occurrence of damage from such activity,
covering a spectrum that ranges from human rights abuses by the dictatorial government that has been provided with financial support 26 to environmental damage caused by the activity being financed 27 and the harm
derived from collusive agreements.
It is thus in the field of inappropriate lending where the theory of abusive credit can make its greatest contribution to the problem of sovereign
debt. In the case of unworthy loans, the doctrine of odious debts has
already developed sound arguments to justify the need for lenders to answer to the debtor state and its victims. 28 Therefore, the situation in
which unworthy loans assume the greatest significance in the context of
responsibility for abusive credit is when they provoke economic repercus26. A. McBeth, Holding the Purse Strings: The Continuing Evolution of Human
Rights Law and the Potential Liability of the Finance Industry for Human Rights
Abuses, 23 Netherlands Q. of Hum. Rts 7 (Mar. 2005); J.P., Bohoslavsky, "Responsabilidad por financiamiento de delitos de lesa humanidad: el caso argentino,"
Suplemento de Derecho Constitucional, L.L., May 2008.
27. J.-P. Buyle, La responsabilitg du banquier, dispensateur de credit, en matidre
d'environnement, AMtNAGEMENT ENVIRONNMENT URBANISME ET DROIT
FONCIER

(Kluwer, ed. 2004).

28. L. Buchheith, et. al., The Dilemma of Odious Debt, 56 DUKE L.J. 1201 (2007); S.
MICHALOWSKI, UnconstitutionalRegimes and the Validity of Sovereign Debt (Ashgate Publishing 2007).
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sions derived from concealment of reality by providing the debtor with an
appearance of reliability.
From the 1970s to the present, the ways in which states have been able
to borrow money can be categorized as follows: bank loans, which were
adopted by the credit market up until the Brady Plan (1989), official financing by IFIs, and the issue of bonds and the atomizing of the debt
among millions of bond-holders. Each of these situations is different and
thus requires a different focus.
The specific analysis should be evaluated according to criteria established by the general theory on abusive credit: whether there was a duty
to act prudently, whether it was deliberately violated, or whether the
creditor was harmed due to lack of due diligence (the duty to self-inform). It should also be studied whether the creditor claiming to be a
victim has indeed been harmed, and if there was a causal nexus between
the abusive credit and the impact on this creditor.
The peculiarities of each class of creditor and each type of operation
will determine what will be required for the definition of responsibility.
In principle, those creditors with the greatest resources available to evaluate the credit risks of the loans, and which have the largest volume of
financing availability, will be more likely to incur this type of responsibility. For example, it will be necessary to take into account considerations
such as the fact that banks and investors act for profit, so that their behavior is presumed to be rational from an economic point of view. Therefore, a bank could not claim in its defense that there are extra-economic
reasons for its decision to grant loans, unlike the situation that could exist
in the case of bilateral loans ("political debt" under the nomenclature of
the International Working Group on External Debt Statistics).
Banks could be expected to act with highly skilled diligence in carrying
out their lending since their decisions are a signal to the market that must
29
not be sent out arbitrarily as it could generate negative externalities.
The sphere of sovereign credit is no exception. Although it is true that
sovereign risk presents features that are more complex to evaluate than
private risks, there are, within certain limitations, technical possibilities of
forecasting whether or not a state will be able to pay its debts.
With regard to loans granted by states, they often have a political motivation. Prima facie, they would not seem to be capable of generating
false appearances because serious, grounded expectations cannot be
placed on them based on any risk analysis preceding the granting of the
loan. However, credit granted for commercial reasons could be an exception to this principle. Loans between states frequently do not explicitly
indicate the existence of these considerations, so that in their absence it
would have to be assumed that what the official lender intended was to
29. M. Coester & B. Markesinis, Liability of FinancialExperts in German and American Law: An Exercise in Comparative Methodology, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 275
(2003).
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profit from the business. This implies the assumption of precautionary
duties that form part of the rules on the evaluation of credit risk.
In the case of IFIs, whether the IMF or international development
banks, although their intention is not to make profits from their lending
activities, they make money and they aim at doing so. Their respective
charters require them to ensure that the loans granted to member countries will be repaid, which presumes a proper evaluation of the sovereign
state's payment capacity. This prudent duty is not adequately encouraged
because of the de facto nature of a preferred creditor that the IMF
claims. 30 Loans granted by the IMF, together with its approval of a country's policies, have on more than one occasion acted as a true solvency
credential for the sovereign country (although in the light of the failure of
so many programs, this is a principle that needs to be very carefully
weighted).
The conditions that IFIs attach to their loans can also contribute to the
postponement of definitive solutions with regard to the debts of such
countries. These conditions respond to policies promoted mainly by the
IMF and the World Bank, and could fail, thereby aggravating the situation of member states. These IFIs often tend to act in the role of consultants, and their recommendations regarding the functioning of the
economy in general, and specific projects in particular, could cause severe
harm to the country itself and third parties if they fail to comply with
elementary rules of prudence. These circumstances could aggravate responsibility for the granting of abusive credit.
The sale of sovereign bonds worldwide can also enable a state to overdraw its account while postponing the inevitable recognition of its inability to face its financial commitments. Nevertheless, there are two weighty
factors that lead to the conclusion that bond purchasers could only be
assigned responsibility in very exceptional cases.
In the first place, the amount of bonds acquired on the market by each
individual investor has an almost negligible impact on the overall economic situation of the debtor. While total bond issue amounts can have
decisive influence, this global causality cannot be attributed to creditors
holding such truly insignificant credits. As a separate matter, this does
not, however, prevent abuses committed by the traders of the bonds,
which make them responsible towards the customers who are victims of
such financial intermediaries' behavior.
Secondly, small investors (who are in fact financial consumers in the
context of "popular capitalism"), unlike institutional investors, lack the
human and technical resources enjoyed by IFIs, governments, and lending agencies when evaluating the risk of lending transactions, making
30.

K. Raffer, Chapter 10: International FinancialInstitutions and Accountability: The

Need for Drastic Change, in

TRADE, TRANSFERS, AND DEVELOPMENT, PROBLEMS
AND PROSPECrS FOR THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY (Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd.

1993); J. R. Silvestre, Preferred Creditor Status under InternationalLaw: The Case

of the International Monetary Fund, 39 Irrr'L & CoMP. L.Q. 813 (Oct. 1990).
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small bondholders more likely to be victims of abusive lending policies
than to be responsible for them. The amount of any bond purchase tends
to be proportionate to the technical and economic capacity of the purchaser, and these two circumstances impact on the subjective element and
the causal nexus between the behavior of the grantor and the harm recorded by subsequent creditors.
Despite the multiplicity and complexity of factors impacting on the
economy of a country, it is intended to isolate the situation whereby in
the normal course of events it could be assumed that reduction of the
debt as a result of insolvency would be fatal. It is true that it is difficult
for a single creditor to grant a loan so large that it could on its own postpone a country's declaration of insolvency, but in the case of a group of
banks (syndicated loans), institutional investors, or IFIs, this is not unthinkable (a case of large clients). As an example, lending creditors
agreed on the blindaje financiero (2000) and megacanje (2001) for
Argentina.
In the case of the proposed model, it is necessary to bear in mind the
logical and procedural sequence of application of the legal filters. In the
case of sovereign insolvency, the liability would be determined after deduction of void debt. Once the claimable liability has been determined,
distribution criteria would be established for the segment of debt to be
discounted as the subsequent step and as a natural consequence of any
collective insolvency process. The legal content of that criterion of distribution should respond to general legal principles in relation to abusive
credit, operating through the subordination of the loans qualifying as
abusive.
It is recommended that the final decision on the subordination criteria
and reduction of the debt should remain in the hands of a neutral, specially convened arbitration tribunal. In any case, it is necessary to point
out that on a subsidiary basis, the absence of any mechanism or procedure for sovereign insolvency requires the adoption of international custom on the matter. 31 However, this does not apply when the debt
contracts foresee waivers in favor of only one foreign jurisdiction, and as
long as those waivers do not violate the limits imposed by the constitution. This means that, notwithstanding sophisticated and even official
doctrinal proposals, the legal rules on the basis of which the rebuilding of
net worth in the case of abusive sovereign credit would be carried out
(residually), would not require the passing or modification of domestic or
international regulations.
Accordingly, the state, on the basis of fair discussions with creditors,
will determine the objective criteria whereby it will assign greater responsibility to certain creditors, leading to their subordination, which in the
context of insolvency will in all probability imply failure to collect at least
part of their claim.
31. A. Reinisch, Ein Insolvenzrecht far Staaten?, 50
TER 285 (2003).
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The possibility that it could be the sovereign debtor itself (or its judges)
that finally decides on the distribution criteria, would act as an incentive
for all creditors to propose or accept an independent arbitration system.
Likewise, states that are not willing to commit to a neutral decision-making system would be pressured by market reaction because of their reluctance to grant such waivers.
In any case, it would be advisable that an international treaty be approved which gathers and organizes the principles referring to the responsibility of abusive lending, thereby providing clearly established rules
in relation to sovereign loans.
In the remainder of this section, we will outline one possible way to
apply the general theory of abusive credit in the sovereign sphere to a
particular case; we chose the Argentine default on its debt in 2001. One
possible venue for this approach could be the IMF's performance in Argentina over the last fifteen years. There exists a notable coincidence
with the conditions that the general principles of abusive credit require
for a duty to exist to compensate, which would suggest subordination of
the debt.
The recent settlement by the Argentine state of the full amount of its
IMF debt (2005/6) might seem to indicate otherwise. 32 However, payment was arguably made "under protest" given that it was accompanied
33
by a warning of the pernicious effects of the IMF's loans and policies.
The payment itself could be regarded as justified by the economic, political, and financial benefits for the country following from the independence of IMF conditioning; the abusive nature of the credit thus need not
be wiped off.
Future claims for damages against the IMF for the allegedly abusive
nature of its loans can thus not be excluded. Nevertheless, the most appropriate and technically correct procedural option for abusive sovereign
credit is the subordination of loans rather than claims for damages, in
view of the practical and theoretical limitations that such claims could
face: Who would be authorized to claim? Is it possible to sue the IMF?
Where? Who would benefit from any compensation? How would it be
distributed? All this points to the advisability of implementing comprehensive, simultaneous solutions that only the credit subordination system
would offer.
Another aspect is the behavior of bond brokers regarding Argentine
debt. One element that contributed to the euphoria of the 1990s was the
behavior recorded by the agents that brokered the Argentine bonds at
the end of the decade and in 2000-2001. They violated the most elementary financial prudence guidelines, as evidenced by the rising volume of
case law (Germany, Italy) that has made banks responsible for the harm
32. J.P. Bohoslavsky, Matices y derivacionesjuridicas del pago al FMI, SUPLEMENTO
DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL, LA LEY, (Mar. 10, 2006), at 4.
33. See International Monetary Fund, Evaluation Report: The IMF and Argentina
1991-2001, IMF Evaluation Office (June 30, 2004), available at www.imf.org.
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caused to their investing clients because they failed to fully and truthfully
inform them of the risks implicit in the "Tango" bonds (lack of due diligence in giving advice). 34 Although the general theory of abusive credit
considers the concurrence of causes as normal, the adage of res ipsa loquitur arising from the Argentine case allows it to be inferred that as a
rule various creditors-and even the debtor itself-would be held responsible for the generation of the harm that it is intended to repair.
Next, we will review a few possible interjections to our proposal. The
question of the applicable law is not grave, since regardless of whether
one applies the law of the domicile of the creditor, that of the debtor, or
general principles of Law, the possibility of challenging the abusive granting of sovereign credit can be admitted in court. Yet, we have to pay
attention to the following aspects enunciated below. Rules of conflict of
law should be taken into account to determine the competent jurisdiction
as well as the substantive rules applicable in cases where responsibility is
recognized for the abusive granting of credit.
Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that although it is not a matter
that has been developed by pertinent case law, 35 and, although it can be
explained by resorting to both international practice on the matter and to
the sovereignty principle, when harm materializes in the form of a deterioration of the situation of the debtor (previously-existing creditors) it
makes most sense to say that the harm occurred in the debtor country
itself. For the determination of the question of jurisdiction, it follows that
the sovereign debtor should have jurisdiction over such matters in a subsidiary manner to the setting up of a neutral arbitration tribunal.
On the other hand, if the damage derives from unwarranted trust that
abusive credit has encouraged in others, and if an arbitration tribunal is
found not to be viable (and/or politically undesirable), the place of fulfillment of the contracts with the creditors who have been harmed will determine the place where the harm has been perpetrated. In any event,
the system used for claims by subsequent creditors is of secondary interest, as the claims filed by those who bought bonds (increasingly being
syndicated 36 ) against the intermediaries who sold them (based on the
main hypothesis of false appearances and misplaced confidence) largely
satisfy the interests of those creditors who could be classified as "subsequent" in the framework of the theory of abusive credit. When these
creditors are not satisfied by these contractual claims, they should be incorporated into the general subordination rules.
In the restricted case of collusion between lenders and officials of the
sovereign borrower, where the debtor states themselves may be claim34. See Tribunale di Venezia, Sezione II, Nov. 22. 2004, N' 2654, I Contratti, No 1,
2005.
35. With the exception of Sez. I Civ., October 9th 2001, N' 12.368, I1Fallimento, 2002,
p. 1157 ff.; Banca Borsa, 2002, II, p. 264 ff; Corte Suprema di Cassazzione, Sezioni
Unite, March 28 2006, N' 7030, I1Diritto Fallimentare, 2006, N' 5, p. 615-642.
36. See F.
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ants, it would be necessary to determine where the events took place and
where their effects were recorded (again only in the case that it is not
possible to set up an arbitration tribunal).
Given that the institutional framework to which sovereign insolvency is
connected may change, for example by granting deciding powers to arbitration tribunals, it should be noted that the application of general principles of international law has been admitted not only at the International
Court of Justice, but also at international arbitration tribunals. 37 This
means that the applicability of the principles described in this paper will
not depend on the nature of the organ or body that defines the distribution of the financial burden according to the criteria that determine the
responsibility for abusive credit.
Collective action clauses are unlikely to reinforce the principle of responsibility for granting abusive loans, since abusive creditors can be presumed to not give up voluntarily their claim on liquidated assets in favor
of the other creditors. Lacking incentives from the legal framework, this
collective action problem cannot be solved spontaneously by its protagonists. This is why all domestic bankruptcy systems foresee a third and
impartial party for this kind of conflict.
Finally, we note that the idea proposed in this paper is in line with the
requirements of contemporary arbitration jurisprudence regarding the
protection of foreign investment: A foreign investor can only invoke the
principle of fair and equitable treatment if she carried out the investment
on the basis of an adequate risk evaluation; otherwise, the investor is responsible for any damage that arises (caveat investor test). 38 This elementary legal guideline, in turn, reflects one of the guidelines of modern
economics: it is neither possible nor desirable to protect all investments
against any act that might affect them because this would be inconsistent
with the efficient operation of a modern market economy, which requires
the assumption of entrepreneurial risk for the earning of profit. 39
VI.

CONCLUSIONS

We attempted to show in this paper that, under restricted conditions,
with a limited scope, and without disregarding the varied nature of the
players (the state and its creditors of various kinds), there would be legal
justification for extending the application of the rules established in the
original abusive credit context to sovereign debt. We furthermore
37. I. Brownie,

PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
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claimed that this would also impose higher standards of good practice on
the participating parties-both public and private-in international finance and would therefore enhance the efficient functioning of market
economies.
It should be pointed out that the theory of abusive credit, in both private and sovereign spheres, is based on a market failure. Abusive credit
is a manifestation of imperfect and asymmetrical information, generating
a negative externality for other market participants (for instance, former
and subsequent creditors). This behavior violates the norms of professional prudence. Applying the legal tool of responsibility for the abusive
granting of credit, protecting confidence as an ethical and legal principle
is a corrective remedy for this market failure. It demands greater rigor
from market agents in obtaining, processing and transmitting information, which will presumably impact on their financial behavior.
The theory under analysis is of particular interest when this credit phenomenon arises in the context of insolvency, where it becomes a typical
class action problem common to such processes. Once some actors detect
the real situation of the debtor, they might attempt to gain an unfair advantage over others. This is the point where the persuasive and
reparatory mechanism of responsibility for abusive credit intercedes, promoting a constructive attitude by all creditors.
We note that our proposal does not address problems and inefficiencies
that arise from the side of the borrower. Governments contract sovereign
loans, and for this reason legal tools must be developed to prevent inefficiency and corruption, which would call for special regulations that limit
these excesses. While exceeding the scope of this paper, this would be an
interesting venue for future research.
Despite the fact that procedural aspects and the implementation of the
principle of responsibility for granting abusive loans might need further
development in which political variables would play a crucial role, we
believe that the legal principle of responsibility for abusive granting of
sovereign credit as examined in this paper can be applied in the international field, and that it would imply a sound rule of law for the economic
players.
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